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The Economy and Environment Program for 
Southeast Asia (EEPSEA) was established 
in May 1993 to support training and 
research in environmental and resource 
economics across its 9 member 
countries: Cambodia, China, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, 
the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. 
Its goal is to strengthen local capacity for 
the economic analysis of environmental 
problems so that researchers can provide 
sound advice .to policymakers. 
EEP$EA Policy Briefs summarize the key 
results and lessons generated by EEPSEA-
supported research projects, as presented 
in detail in EEP$EA Research Reports. 
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To reduce industrial 
pollution and improve 
environmental quality, the 
governments of developed 
and developing countries 
have enacted a large number 
of environmental regulations 
since the beginning of the 
1970s . However , regulations 
do not automatically lead to 
an improvement in -+ 
A summary 01 EEPSEA research report 2008·RR4 'Pollution Taxation in China: The 
Impact of Inspections' by Liguo Lin, c/o School of Economics, Shanghai University of 
Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China 200433. Email: liguoJin@hotmail.com 
"Inspections do not significantly reduce .. 
~ e nvi ronmental quality since 
they m ay turn out to be ineffective 
if they are not enforced properly. 
Highlighting this problem , a new 
EEPSEA study from Ch ina 
pinpo ints a number of flaws in the 
system used to enforce the 
co untry' s pollution control 
legisla tion. 
The study is the work of 
Liguo Lin from the School of 
Eco nomics at th e Shanghai 
U niversity of Finance and 
Economics . He finds that 
many firms under-report their 
poll ution production levels . 
This happens when they take 
part in the self-reporting 
process that is a key stage of 
China's pollution control 
system. Hi s study also sh ows 
that , while enforcement 
inspections do improve the 
veracity of the pollution 
reports that fi r ms submit, 
these inspections do not 
significantly reduce the 
am o unt o f pollution that firms 
produce. 
Pollution Control in China 
Chin a's recent industrial growth 
has been extre m ely rapid. Since 
the 19805, industrial outpu t h as 
increased by more than 10% 
annually. Industry has now 
become the largest sector in 
Ch ina ' s economy and accounts for 
approximately 50% of the 
country' s tota l GD P . However, 
this rapid growth has been 
acco mpanied b y massive amounts 
of environ mental pollution and 
degradatio n. For example , almost 
one third of China's waterways are 
n ear biological death due to the 
excessive discharge of o rganic 
pollutants. In many urban areas , 
atmospheric concentrations of 
pollutants such as su spended 
particles and sulfur dioxide 
ro utinely exceed World Health 
Organization safety standards by 
very large margins. Industry is 
acknowledged as the primary 
source of much of this water and 
air pollution. Indeed , China's 
State Environmental Protection 
Agency (SEPA) estimates that 
industry accounts for over 70% of 
the nation's total pollution 
emissions. 
In response to this growing 
challenge, the coun try has been 
implementing environm ental 
protection legislation for well 
over 30 years. Today, the main 
environmental protection law 
re lating to industrial pollution 
is based on a pollution levy 
sys tem. This is a two-tier 
pollution tax charge system , 
which levies uniform payments 
for pollution levels that are 
'within sta ndard ' and applies 
h igher , escalating rates for 
above -standard pollution. 
Under th is syste m all polluters 
have to provide government 
authorities with a predicted 
figure for the volume of 
pollution they will produce in 
th e coming year . During the 
year , plants are then required 
to modify their reports if their 
actual emissions are different 
from their predictions. Plants' 
reports are th en verified by 
field inspections . At the end of 
each quarte r , plants must pay 
levies o n the pollution they 
produce . In principle firms 
can be further p enalized for 
vio lating pollution standards, 
however penalties are only 
imposed when firms' pollution 
exceeds legal standards by a 
Descriptive statistics of sample (quarterly data, 2002) 
Variables Mean per quarter Siandard deviation 
Value of output 4.41 6.52 
(10 million yuan) 
Number of Employees 443.28 32 1.66 
COD discharge (tonnes) 25 .37 53.61 
TSS discharge (tonnes) 8.68 17.53 
COD concentration (mgtl) 310.99 85.92 
TSS concentration (mgtl) 145.78 78.15 
Age (decades) 2.29 1.31 
Inspection (no. of times) 2.19 1.52 
Ci tizen's Compla ints 0.07 0.27 
(no. of times) 
Adapt to low Rate 62% 
Adapt to High Rate 38% 
Food 37% 
Chem ica ls 39% 
Paper 15% 




Number of plants 137 
Number of observations 548 
NOI~: 
(1) coo means Chemical ())cygen Oem.md and TSS mean~ TOMI Suspended Solids. 80Ih refer 10 the wilter poIll,ll.lnts meiIW~ In this 
~h.dy. 
(2) Age meilr15 how long the li.m~ h.lve been estilblished. 
()) Adilp! to Low Rate meilns the percentage of firms in the l<lmple that paid taxation according to the lower .~te R_ fgi\ll'fl th~1 ~~ R-': 
and vice versa lor the Adapt to High Rate (R_ ) va. iab le. As shown in Equation 1, there are twO above-stand~rd rates lor ~h I"'" Ut.lnt: 
R_ and R_ (taking COD ~s an e~ample). 
(4) Food, Chemicals, Paper and Medicine refer to the 5eCtors. 
(5) State·owned, Co llecHve and loint·ve nture refer to type 01 ownership 
(6) Number of observat ions is the number of fi rms mu ltiplied by 4 be<:au~ for each fi rm th ere were lour observations corresponding to 
the four qUJ"cr~ of the year 2002. 
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the amount of pollution that firms produce." 
large margin . Local 
environm ental protection 
bureaus (EPBs) are 
responsible fo r most activities 
relating to th e actual 
implementation of these 
environmen tal r egulations. 
Does the System Work? 
In light of th e pollution challenge 
facing China, L iguo Lin set out 
to see how effec tive th e 
en forcement of the 
environmen tal pollution 
legislation is . In particular, h e 
aimed to see h ow polluting firms 
react to environmental 
enforcement inspections and 
whether these inspections h elp 
reduce industrial pollution. 
The data used in this 
analysis was obtained from the 
Fuzhou Environmental 
Protection Bu reau (FEPB). 
Fuzhou is the capital city of the 
Fujian province , which is 
located on the southeast part of 
China. Over the course of the ' 
last decade, Fuzhou's industrial 
output has increased at an 
average rate of I 2% annually. 
However, as a result of this 
rapid expansion, both air and 
water ambient qu ali ty h as 
deteriorated. For instance, in 
2006 over 2'5% of rain was 
acid and had a pH value of 
between 5.0 and 5.6. 
Liguo Lin assessed 
information on the COD 
emissions from 137 p lants for 
Results of emission equations (OLS) 
(Sample Size: 411') 
Independent COD Discharge TSS Discharge 
Variable Absolute Relative Absolute Relative 
INS, 2.0532 1.0974 0.5694 0.0155 
(0.9367) (0.6705) (0.3969) (0.3599) 
INS,., 0.3612 -0.6399 0.6364 0.6081 
(1.03 14) (0.7383) (0.437) (0.3962) 
OPT, 6.8907 ~.0358 2.0990 0. 1284 
(0.2758) (0. 1974) (0.1169) (0.106) 
f'\GE 1.1226 1.1829 -0.0905 -0.4049 
(1.3655) (0.9774) (0.5785) (0.5246) 
EMP 0.0002 0.0032 -0.0056 ~0.0035 
(0.0062) (0.0045) (0.0026) 1(0.0024) 
Rate 6.3792 3.2934 -0.2427 11.7097 
(3. 1447) (2.251 2) (1.3325) (1.2082) 
Food -37.9595 26.81 13 5.7401 12 .582 1 
(4.6471 ) (3.3267) (1.9691) (1.7857) 
Paper 34.4710 27.8507 2.244 3.6405 
(5.02 19) (3.5949) (2.2 179) (1.9293) 
Chemicals -28.9541 -19.8509 -3.2032 3.4754 
(4.2442) (3.03 83) (1.7984) (1.6306) 
State-owned 14.7699 6.7475 7. 1409 12.5958 
(3.9503) (2 .8278) (1.6738) (1.5176) 
Collective 9.7196 5.9849 12·5566 10·0475 
(3 .1824) (2.2781 ) (1.3485) (1.2226) 
Constant 14.6644 12.0357 10.2173 2.0758 
(5.7726) (4.1324) (2.446) (2.2 178) 
R' 0.8224 0.7682 0.6924 0.0508 
Note: The second row for each variable shows the standard deViations. 
the year 2002. Plants th at pay 
levies for COD p ollution were 
selected, as it was felt that these 
firms were most likely to 
u nderreport their p o llution in 
o r der to avoid levies . T h e study 
also focused on th e food, 
chemical , paper an d medicine 
sectors , as these industries are 
large producers of COD 
pollu tion. Quarterly p lant-
level data was scrutinized to get 
a good picture of h ow 
inspection visits affect plant 
b eh avior over time. It was 
found that, on average , th e 
plants in the study were visited 
by inspectors twice per quarter. 
In fact, al most all plants 
assessed had at least one field 
inspection each qu arter wh ile 
one plant had 8 inspections a 
quarter. 
Does Self-reporting Work? 
To see whether firms were being 
truthful in their self-reporting 
L iguo L in assessed th e difference 
between firms ' self-reported 
emission levels and levels found 
during inspections (i.e. the 
amount of pollution for which 
firms ended up p aying levies) . His 
results indicate th at, in general , 
the concentration and volume of 
COD self- reported by firms is 
significantly lower th an the figures 
obtained during verification visits. 
It is therefore clear that firms 
systematically under report their 
pollution . 
The reason for this 
widespread under- r eporting 
can be explained by th e self 
reporting procedures which 
provide firms with room to 
report 'strategically' in order to 
m inimize the amount of levies 
th ey h ave to pay. For instance. 
p lan ts can just p r edict a low 
level of emissions in their 
reports at the beginning of a 
year. They can then decide 
whether to modify th eir initial 
reports depending on how 
many inspections are 
subsequently imp osed on 
them. Moreover, u n der th e 
self - reporting system , wh en 
Environmental Enfo rcement Under Thr Spotlight - A Study Of Industrial Pollution Control In China 
firms deliver false reports and 
are caught by the authorities, 
they a re only liable to financial 
penalties and no other 
punishmen ts such as the 
imprisonment of managers or 
owners (they must pay any 
evaded levy and between 100% 
and 300% extra). This means 
that the p enalty for false 
reporting o n ly involves a 
capped financia l cost - a 
situ at ion that makes it 'cost 
effective' for so me firms to 
'take the gambl e' and under 
report. 
To see if environmental 
inspections have any impact on 
fi rms at all, Liguo Lin looked 
at h ow inspections affected the 
actu al levels of pollution 
repo rted . H e looked at the 
levels of COD and TSS 
discharge reported by firms 
(both absolu te and relative to 
discha rge standards). He also 
compared reports that were 
produced by firms at times 
when th ey were being inspected 
and at tim es when they were 
n ot. H e fo und that when 
in sp ections and reporting 
co incided , this increased the 
absolu te and relative levels of 
CO D pollution self- reported 
by firms by up to 8.26% and 
7.91%, respectively. However, 
h e also found that . when 
inspectio ns a nd reports were 
not done in the same time 
period, the inspections made 
no difference to th e amount of 
pollution reported. In other 
wo rds inspections do not force 
plants into making actual 
improvements in their 
environmental performance. 
In sh ort, the results show that 
inspections are effective at 
making p lants report their 
pollution discharges more 
truthfully , but they do not 
actually put pressure on firms 
to reduce their polluting 
activities . 
Liguo Lin also found th at 
inspections had no significant 
effects on the reporting of TSS 
discharges at any time. This 
finding can be explained by 
the fact th at firms that produce 
multiple pollutants are only 
required to pay levies on the 
pollutant that exceeds 
discharge standard by the 
g rea test amount; therefore , 
plants can 'ge t away' with only 
focu sing on one pollutant and 
not acting to curb their 
polluting act ivity across the 
board . 
How to Improve the 
Environmental Enforcement 
System 
liguo Lin 's results are in stark 
co ntrast with sim ilar studies from 
the US and Ca n ada which find 
that insp ections do encourage 
firm s to reduce the amount of 
pollution they produce . The 
difference between the 
environmental regulations of 
these western countries and China 
go es so me way to explaining why 
this is the case. Most importantly, 
EEPSEA is administered by Canada's 
the US and Canada implement 
emission standards and heavily 
penalize companies that produce 
pollution over these standards 
(both financially and through 
legal channels). In contrast China 
uses emission taxation and allows 
firms to conti nue polluting over 
regulatory levels if they pay the 
required levy - this gives firms 
littl e incentive to clean up their 
act by, for example, investing in 
pollution clean - up technology . 
Moreover, as Liguo Lin shows, 
China's pollution control system 
does not provide plants with a 
strong incentive to even report 
their emission s truthfully. as there 
are limited monetary penalties for 
fraudulent reporting. 
O verall , it is clear that if 
C hina is to Signifi cantly reduce 
the amount of pollution 
produced by its industrial . 
growth, th en a reform of its 
environmental legislation is 
necessary. This reform will 
have to address not only how 
polluting firms are penalized, 
but wi ll also have to revise the 
procedures for environmental 
enforcement. Both facets of 
environmental pollution 
control must b e re - designed so 
th at they provide a real 
incentive for firms to reduce 
the amount of pollution they 
produce . Legislatory reform 
must also make it much more 
difficult for firms to fa lse ly 
report their polluting activities 
and to carry on polluting - as 
is the case at present. 
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